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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Studying the failures of the past can be useful in 
mitigating the incidence and potential of future fail-
ures. A first step towards the understanding and 
quantification of the risk of failure of bridges can be 
provided by acquiring knowledge on the failure 
mechanisms of existing structures and the root of 
causes of collapse. Studies aimed independently for 
different types of bridges, in terms of their material 
and form, may lead to the identification of predomi-
nant failure causes and modes for each bridge type. 
Clearly, trends picked up through statistical analysis 
can aid in identifying and understanding the poten-
tial of the most significant hazards affecting bridge 
structures and help in planning against their conse-
quences. Such studies are restricted by the fact that 
many partial failures are not reported publicly and 
even amongst those that are, many have not been 
examined in sufficient detail. Nevertheless, over the 
last decades, engineers have realised the importance 
of collecting and archiving information regarding 
structural failures and have attempted to review this 
information in a collective manner.  
One of the largest databases of bridge failures has 
been established by Imhof as part of his PhD thesis 
(Imhof 2004). It contains 347 cases during the pe-
riod between 1813 and 2004 and comprises road as 
well as railway and pedestrian bridges. The statistics 
in his database have shown that natural hazards to-
gether with ship and vehicle impacts make the larg-
est contribution to the actual collapses. Flooding, 
scour and earthquakes were found to be on top of the 
list in terms of natural hazards. This database has 
now been updated by incorporating the latest inci-
dents from 2004 onwards and can be easily accessed 
via the web (Bridge Forum 2009). 
Supporting the trends observed in Imhof’s data-
base, reviews of bridge failures in the period 1977-
2000 in the USA has similarly revealed vehicle im-
pacts together with flooding and scour as the pri-
mary causes of bridge failures (Hadipriono 1985; 
Hadipriono & Diaz 1988; Harik et al. 1990; Warda-
hana & Hadipriono 2003). A similar review of 
worldwide bridge failures has shown an analogous 
trend (Smith 1976; Biezma & Schanack 2007). A 
separate analysis of structural failures comparing 
different types of structures has shown that bridges 
are one of the riskiest structure types in terms of 
failure consequences as they resulted in the highest 
number of deaths and injuries as compared to other 
types of structures (Eldukair et al. 1991).  
Apart from general analyses of bridge failure sta-
tistics, there have also been studies focusing on par-
ticular cases of bridge collapses in more detail. For 
example, Sibly & Walker (1977) present an in-depth 
review and discussion of the collapses of four metal-
lic bridges caused by design errors. A detailed dis-
cussion of a number of bridge failures, their causes 
and the lessons learned from each of them is pre-
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quences and their significance in risk assessment of bridge structures. 
sented by Ross (1984), Feld & Carper (1997), Akes-
son (2008) and Collins (2008). 
On the other hand, some studies have concen-
trated on a specific failure cause and reviewed the 
resulting bridge collapses. For example, a review of 
131 bridge failures in the UK due to scour/flood dur-
ing the period between 1846-2003 was carried out 
(JBA Consulting 2004). A similar review of UK 
bridge collapses due to flood events has also been 
presented by Reed (2004).  
A high proportion of structural failures have oc-
curred as a consequence of human errors in design 
or construction. Although these are difficult to quan-
tify, there have been attempts in the past to propose 
methods for taking these into account and analyse 
their effect on structural reliability (Nowak 1979; 
Nowak & Carr 1985; Ellingwood 1987). Criteria by 
which the proneness to failure of a proposed design 
may be judged were suggested by Pugsley (1973) 
and a more mathematical approach was developed 
by Blockley (1976). 
The aim of this paper is to synthesise and classify 
damage/failure/collapse cases of metallic bridges 
worldwide from the early 19th century up to the pre-
sent. A database of 164 failures of metallic bridges 
extracted from the literature, the web and news re-
ports was compiled. The evaluation of the database 
is carried out in terms of identifying the factors con-
tributing to the failure or collapse, the modes of fail-
ure or collapse as well as an analysis of the struc-
tural form of the bridges. Other points which are 
considered are the construction date and age of the 
failed bridges and the number of casualties resulting 
from the failures. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the significance of consequence analysis 
in terms of risk assessment giving some general 
guidelines on how consequences of bridge failure 
can be quantified. 
2 ANALYSIS OF FAILURE DATA 
 
A total of 164 cases of failure of metallic bridges 
were retrieved from the literature. Of these 53% 
were highway bridges, 34% were railway bridges 
and a small percentage were footbridges. Of the 164 
reported cases, 87 (51%) were classified as ‘col-
lapse’, 73 (47%) as ‘no collapse’ and 4 (3%) as un-
known. For the purposes of this study, ‘collapse’ is 
defined as one or more structural elements falling 
down from the bridge as a result of the failure ren-
dering the structure incapable of remaining in ser-
vice. ‘No collapse’ covers the cases that have re-
sulted in loss of function (such as fatigue cracking 
which could result in collapse if left unchecked) and 
have caused bridge closures, repairs or strengthening 
works. Considering the cases which resulted in col-
lapse, about two third took place while the bridge 
was in service whereas the remaining one third oc-
curred during construction. It should be noted that in 
compiling the database, cases for which dam-
age/collapse was attributed to earthquake action or 
wars have been excluded. However, other natural 
hazards (e.g. flooding, extreme wind) are included. 
The processing and statistical representation of 
the collected data is a complex process which should 
be undertaken with caution as the causes and differ-
ent modes of failure are widespread. A systematic 
classification is essential in order to be instructive 
and amenable to comparison with preceding studies. 
In this paper, the causes of failure have been divided 
into design errors, limited knowledge, natural haz-
ards (excluding earthquakes), human errors, acci-
dents, overloading and corrosion. Design errors in-
clude cases where there was evidence of incorrect 
design assumptions, wrong estimation of loads, 
oversight of failure modes etc. Limited knowledge 
captures the cases where there was insufficient un-
derstanding of a failure mode, such as aerodynamic 
instability or a structural/material problem such as 
brittle fracture, fatigue or buckling. Failures due to 
limited knowledge usually took place with the intro-
duction of new materials or new forms of design or 
due to severe extrapolation of what at the time had 
proved successful. Natural hazards encompass the 
case where failures have taken place due to extreme 
loading such as flooding, storms or very high winds. 
Human errors are distinguished from design errors 
and cover those failures caused by negligence, igno-
rance, mistakes in calculations, as well as poor 
workmanship, wrong assembly sequence, etc. Acci-
dents pertain to vehicle and ship impacts, fire and 
explosions (excluding war actions, vandalism and 
terrorist attacks). Bridge failures caused by deterio-
ration are covered by the corrosion category. It 
should be mentioned here that, in many cases, fail-
ure is caused by a combination of causes. In these 
cases, an attempt has been made to identify as far as 
possible the primary cause, and to classify the case 
accordingly. Arguably, another approach would 
have been to allow multiple causes to be attributed, 
and to thus examine the relative presence of differ-
ent adverse factors, regardless of whether they were 
the main cause of any particular incident. However, 
there are difficulties with the latter approach, not 
least the fact that the results would lack the sharp-
ness and focus provided through the former. 
2.1 Collapsed bridges 
The majority of the 87 cases of metallic bridge col-
lapses occurred in the USA (36%) and UK (20%), 
partly due to the large number of such bridges in 
these countries. The distribution of failure causes for 
the collapse database is shown in Figure 1. The most 
important factors (almost equally) contributing to 
collapse are design errors (22%), limited knowledge 
(22%) and natural hazards (21%); these are followed  
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Figure 1. Failure causes leading to collapse of metallic bridges. 
 
 
by accidents (14%), human errors (13%) and over-
loading (5%). Clearly, there is no single dominant 
cause of collapse for metallic bridges, though the top 
three amount to almost two thirds of the whole. In 
contrast, Imhof’s analysis for all bridge types re-
vealed the following: natural hazard (29%), design 
errors (21%), accidents (18%), overloading (10%), 
human errors (10%), limited knowledge (10%), cor-
rosion (2%). An interesting observation is that lim-
ited knowledge appears to be a more frequent cause 
of failure for metallic bridges, as compared to the 
entire bridge failure database. This could be attrib-
uted to the way in which the technology for metallic 
bridges often moved in spurts, typically related to 
progress in iron/steel manufacturing and/or assem-
bly, with structural understanding following suite. 
Natural hazards and design errors are at the top of 
the list for both databases, although the former cause 
appears to have a slightly less influence within the 
metallic bridge subset. Overloading is found to have 
a less profound effect on metallic bridges as com-
pared to the entire bridge database. It is also interest-
ing to note that only 3 collapses out of 87 (3%) ap-
pear to be triggered by corrosion problems, which is 
also in agreement with Imhof’s results, though the 
quality/detail of the retrieved data may be partly in-
fluencing this observation. In other words, deteriora-
tion due to corrosion is, more often than not, ad-
dressed before it has reached a level at which it is 
the primary reason for a collapse. 
Table 1 attempts to compare failure causes for 
different time periods. It can be seen that limited 
knowledge played a major role in the recorded col-
lapses up to the mid-twentieth century. This coin-
cides with periods when fatigue, fracture and buck-
ling were still not fully understood and materials 
with imprecisely known behaviour were first intro-
duced such as cast and wrought iron and high 
strength steel. These resulted in 5 bridges which col-
lapsed, in that period, due to fatigue failure, 4 due to 
buckling of compression members and 4 due to brit-
tle fracture. As Table 1 shows, collapses due to lim-
ited knowledge have considerably decreased in re-
cent decades with the last being the catastrophic 
1970 and 1971 box-girder bridge collapses in Mil-
ford Haven, UK, West Gate, Australia and Koblenz, 
Germany due to buckling effects. Table 1 shows no 
obvious trend in terms of design errors and human 
errors, which is an interesting observation, given the 
emphasis on quality assurance and other human er-
ror mitigating procedures introduced in the past 
thirty years. On the other hand, there appears to be 
an overall increase in the percentage of bridge col-
lapses due to natural hazards and accidents over the 
years. The latter can be attributed to the continuous 
increase in transportation demand, both highway and 
railway as well as waterway ship traffic, which re-
sulted in a number of vessel impacts to bridges. The 
increase in bridge collapses due to natural hazards 
may be attributed, on one hand, to the development 
of infrastructure in more hazardous terrain, and, on 
the other, to changing environmental conditions and 
more extreme weather circumstances observed dur-
ing the last decades, though it is speculative to sug-
gest that this is linked in some way to climate 
change effects. 
In Table 2, the bridge collapses are divided be-
tween those that happened during the construction 
stage of the bridge and those that took place when 
the bridge was in service. As previously mentioned, 
two thirds of the collapses took place while the 
bridge was in service whereas the remaining one 
third occurred during construction. Table 2 shows 
that design and human errors are more common dur-
ing the construction stage but play a secondary role 
when compared to natural hazards and accidents for 
completed bridges. 
The distribution of the failures modes for the 87 
cases of bridge collapses is shown in Figure 2. It can 
be seen that for metallic bridges the most frequently 
encountered modes are scour of piers/foundations 
(17%), buckling (16%), fatigue (13%), impact 
(13%) and fracture (9%). Though scour is an impor-
tant failure mode for all types of bridges, fatigue and 
fracture taken in combination appears to be the most 
critical failure mode for metallic bridges, closely fol-
lowed by buckling. It should be noted that 14% of 
the failure modes are classified as unknown due to 
insufficient detail in the information provided. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Cause of bridge collapses by date of failure.  __________________________________________________ 
Collapse cause        Pre-1900   1900-1940   1941-1990   1991- __________________________________________________ 
Limited knowledge   10 (53%)    5 (36%)      4 (13%)    0  (0%) 
Design errors         4 (21%)    4 (29%)      7 (23%)    5(25%) 
Natural hazards          1  (5%)     3 (21%)     8 (26%)   6 (30%)   
Accidents        1  (5%)      1  (7%)      6 (19%)   4 (20%) 
Human errors          2 (11%)     1  (7%)      4 (13%)   2 (10%) __________________________________________________ 
  
    
Table 2. Cause of bridge collapses by stage of failure.  __________________________________________________ 
Collapse cause               During construction          In service __________________________________________________ 
Limited knowledge                   5 (26%)                   14   (74%) 
Design errors               14 (70%)        6   (30%) 
Natural hazards                  0   (0%)      18 (100%)   
Accidents             0   (0%)      12 (100%) 
Human errors               8  (73%)        3   (27%) __________________________________________________ 
 
Scour
17%
Buckling
16%
Unknown 
14%Fatigue
13%
Impact 
13%
Fracture 
9%
Overloading
5%
Other
13%
 
Figure 2. Failure modes leading to collapse of metallic bridges. 
 
 
From a more detailed analysis of the data pertain-
ing to the collapsed bridges, it was found that almost 
all collapses (13 out of 14) attributed to buckling 
took place during the construction stage of the 
bridge. Buckling was also found to be the most 
common failure mode associated with design and 
human errors (30% and 36% of the cases, respec-
tively). Looking at impact, more than half of bridge 
collapses (6 out of 11) were caused by ship impacts, 
whereas 16 out of 18 cases of those linked to natural 
hazards were attributed to flooding, scour and hy-
draulic effects on the collapsed bridges. Clearly, 
there is need for more efficient design and assess-
ment of bridges with respect to flood and scour con-
ditions, especially during a period where changing 
environmental conditions have been established as a 
critical issue for civil infrastructure in general, and 
bridge structures in particular. 
The distribution of the collapsed metallic bridges 
with respect to their structural arrangement/form is 
shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, the majority are 
truss bridges (35%) and girder bridges (21%), partly 
due the fact that they comprise the largest fraction of 
the metallic bridge population. As before, for a no-
ticeable proportion (15%), the bridge form has not 
been clearly reported. 
A more detailed analysis reveals that buckling 
was the primary failure mode for all four collapsed 
box girder bridges which demonstrates the suscepti-
bility of this type of bridge to the particular failure 
mode. 
The distribution of the reported collapses with re-
spect to the year of construction of the bridges is 
shown in Figure 4. As can be seen through the two 
peaks on the histogram, the majority of the bridges 
that collapsed were constructed in the period 1870-
1910 and 1950-1970. Perhaps this is of no surprise 
since the first period coincides with the development 
of railway networks in Europe and North America, 
and the concomitant widespread use of cast and 
wrought iron around the world, whereas the second 
period is closely linked to the introduction of weld-
ing technology for bridge construction. Given that a 
relatively high number of bridges were constructed 
during these periods, it may be statistically justified 
that the number of collapses is higher. To answer 
this question more conclusively, the number of col-
lapsed bridges would have to be normalised through 
the number of bridges constructed. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the reported 
collapses with respect to the year the bridge col-
lapses occurred. On first sight, it would appear that 
the number of bridge collapses exhibits an increas-
ing trend. However, this should be viewed within the 
context of the continuous and very considerable in-
crease in the bridge population, as well as the in-
creased tendency for reporting and recording such 
events. In the same figure, the contribution of each 
failure cause to the total number of collapses is also 
presented where it can be clearly seen that the per-
centage of collapses attributed to natural hazards and 
accidents has increased over the last decades 
whereas the contribution of limited knowledge has 
decreased. 
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Figure 3. Structural form of collapsed metallic bridges. 
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Figure 4. Histogram showing reported collapses with respect to 
year of construction of the bridges. 
The effect of bridge span on the number of casu-
alties due to collapse was also investigated (see Fig. 
6) in an attempt to relate a primary bridge design pa-
rameter to the consequences of a potential collapse. 
It could be argued that the longer the bridge span is, 
the higher the fatalities would be. This can, to some 
extent, be seen in Figure 6 where collapsed metallic 
bridges having spans less than 40m resulted in zero 
or less than 10 casualties. However, it can also be 
seen that there are cases of collapsed bridges with 
higher spans resulting in no casualties at all. The 
data is too limited, and too susceptible to outliers, 
for such an argument to be supported by statistical 
evidence. This however does not imply that it is un-
reasonable to link the potential number of casualties 
to bridge span in risk-based assessments. 
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year of collapse and contribution of each failure cause. 
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Figure 6. Number of casualties versus collapsed span for me-
tallic bridges. 
2.2 Non-collapsed bridges 
The distribution of failure modes for the 73 non-
collapsed bridge cases is shown in Figure 7. It can 
be seen that the dominant mode is fatigue (67%), 
followed by impact (10%) and fracture (5%). Once 
more, for 12% of cases the failure modes have not 
been reported in sufficient detail. The fact that such 
a high number of fatigue failures are in this category 
indicates the attention paid to the phenomenon by 
bridge engineers. It also suggests that fatigue failure 
is, more often than not, picked up at an early enough 
stage through inspections (and/or that the level of 
redundancy in metallic bridges with respect to fa-
tigue detail failure is satisfactory) so that it does not 
result in collapse. 
The high percentage of fatigue problems shown 
in Figure 7 may, in part, be attributed to the fact that 
these problems seem to be over-reported, especially 
for welded bridges constructed in the period 1950-
1980. There is a wide range of available data in the 
literature, in the form of case studies, regarding fa-
tigue cracking of metallic bridges (see, for example, 
Fisher 1984). For that reason, the causes resulting in 
fatigue cracking were investigated in more detail 
and a breakdown of these is shown in Figure 8. It 
can be seen that the majority of the fatigue cracking 
observed is attributed to out-of-plane distortions in 
welded structures (29%), unanticipated connection 
fixity and secondary stresses in riveted structures 
(27%), and poor quality material/welding (20%). 
The former two are conditions that were not ac-
counted for explicitly during the design of the 
bridges. It is evident that fatigue is still an area of 
concern, and needs to be further researched both on 
a local and global level. 
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Figure 7. Failure modes for non-collapsed metallic bridges. 
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Figure 8. Nature of fatigue cracking in non-collapsed metallic 
bridges. 
The distribution with respect to the structural 
form of the bridges for the cases defined as no-
collapse is shown in Figure 9. As can be seen, the 
majority are girder bridges (40%) and truss bridges 
(29%) followed by a smaller percentage of arch 
(10%) and lattice girder (8%) bridges. This is in con-
trast to the statistics observed for the set of collapsed 
bridges where the majority were truss bridges fol-
lowed by girder bridges (see Fig. 3). Arguably, fail-
ures can be detected more promptly in girder bridges 
and/or the redundancy of such bridges is higher, thus 
preventing total bridge collapse. 
From further processing of the data pertaining to 
non-collapsed metallic bridges, some interesting ob-
servations can be summarised as follows: 
• 53% of the fatigue problems were encountered 
in welded bridges (26 cases) whereas 41% in 
riveted bridges (20 cases); again, this would 
have to seen in the context or relative popula-
tion sizes, which is not known at present. 
• Out of the 29 cases of non-collapsed girder 
bridges, the vast majority (86%) were found to 
have fatigue problems; 18 of these bridges 
were of welded construction, which suggests 
that, fatigue excepted, the design and construc-
tion of such bridges is well understood and 
executed. 
• In the case of truss bridges, a smaller percent-
age of failures was attributed to fatigue (43%, 
9 bridges). Out of these 9 bridges, 7 were of 
riveted construction, which is perhaps related 
to the large number of riveted truss bridges 
across Europe and North America. 
• The vast majority of failures in arch bridges 
(86%) were also attributed to fatigue prob-
lems. 
• All of the lattice-girder bridges (6 cases) had 
fatigue failures and were all constructed of 
wrought-iron material (in all probability built 
around 150 years ago). 
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Figure 9. Structural configuration of non-collapsed metallic 
bridges. 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE 
 
The consequences of failure are a good indicator of 
the importance of a bridge structure. Considering 
these consequences is essential in both qualitative 
and quantitative risk-based design and assessment. 
Consequences can generally be divided into di-
rect or indirect. Direct consequences can be associ-
ated with possible injuries or fatalities due to the 
failure as well as with re-construction costs of the 
bridge, in the case of total collapse, or repair costs, 
in the case of damage. Indirect consequences, on the 
other hand, may arise due to loss of functionality of 
the transportation network following on from the 
bridge failure and the unavailability of the bridge. 
These can be associated with traffic disruption and 
delay costs due to repair works or detour due to 
complete bridge closure, traffic management costs, 
social and environmental impact costs etc. In some 
cases, bridges are not only elements of the transpor-
tation infrastructure but they also form part of elec-
tricity, telephone, water, gas networks as well 
(Stimpson 2009). Therefore, the consequences of 
bridge failures may extend far wider than the 
boundaries of transportation systems to other forms 
of critical infrastructure. 
Quantification of bridge failure consequences is 
often challenging since it requires determining the 
different contributions. It is customary and practical 
to express consequences in terms of monetary units, 
though this is rarely easy to do. Difficulties are en-
countered in expressing loss of life or injuries in 
monetary units and in quantifying economic, social 
and possible environmental impacts. The duration 
over which a bridge might be unavailable is perhaps 
more uncertain than the replacement cost itself, and 
this is one reason why indirect costs are subject to 
higher levels of uncertainty and ambiguity with re-
spect to the definition of appropriate system bounda-
ries. Nevertheless, there have already been attempts 
to develop models for the estimation of conse-
quences of bridge failures (Imhof 2004; Wong et al. 
2005; Stein & Sedmera 2006), and more is likely to 
appear from both researchers and practitioners in the 
near future, due to a number of drivers, such as in-
frastructure inter-dependency, urbanisation and cli-
mate change adaptation. 
There have been bridge collapses in the past that 
have resulted in significant impact not only in terms 
of direct financial costs but also in terms of wider 
implications to the engineering profession and large 
indirect costs. A failure of a bridge due to an inher-
ent lack of understanding in design may mean the 
strengthening or replacement of a whole class of 
structures, each designed according to the same cri-
teria as the one which collapsed. Changes in codes 
of practices may also need to be introduced follow-
ing a bridge collapse. A typical example was the in-
troduction of new rules for steel bridges in the Brit-
ish Standards after the collapse of the Cleddau box-
girder bridge in Milford Haven, UK and the West 
Gate bridge in Australia. Another example is the 
collapse of the Tacoma Narrows bridge in the USA 
which resulted in immediate retrofit of a number of 
similar bridges, with large associated costs, and led 
to significant research into the dynamic effects of 
wind on bridges and the development of new design 
rules.       
A recent example of the significance of indirect 
consequences of failure is the case of the I-35W 
bridge collapse in Minneapolis in 2007. The direct 
consequences of the failure of the bridge were 13 fa-
talities and 145 injuries and the reconstruction cost 
of the bridge, which was estimated around $234 mil-
lion. The cost of disruption and re-routing due to the 
unavailability of the bridge was estimated as 
$400,000 per day (Minnesota Department of Trans-
portation, 2007) which totals to approximately $150 
million for the duration of the construction of the 
new bridge. Further analyses estimated the economic 
impact or loss to Minnesota’s economy, at about $17 
million in 2007 and $43 million in 2008 (Minnesota 
Department of Employment and Economic Devel-
opment, 2007). It is evident in this case that indirect 
consequences add up close to the level of direct con-
sequences even though the former have only been 
quantified with respect to only some of the possible 
factors (e.g. no social or environmental impact or the 
impact due to reputation loss appear to have been 
considered).    
4 CONCLUSIONS 
A review of failure statistics for metallic bridges was 
presented in this paper. Classification of the 164 
failure cases with respect to whether they resulted in 
total collapse or not, causes of failure, failure modes 
and bridge structural configuration was carried out. 
The results have shown that design errors, natural 
hazards and limited knowledge are the primary fac-
tors contributing to bridge collapses. However, fail-
ures attributed to limited knowledge have been 
found to become increasingly rare during the last 
few decades. Scour and buckling failures were found 
to be the most common collapse modes for metallic 
bridges whereas fatigue was found to be the most 
common failure mode in the case of non-collapsed 
(damaged) metallic bridges. The statistics have also 
shown that truss bridges are more susceptible to total 
collapse failures and girder bridges to failures that 
do not necessarily result in total collapse. Overall, 
incidents attributed to natural hazards and accidents 
show an increasing trend in recent years, with design 
and human errors remaining remarkably constant in 
percentage terms during the investigated 150-year 
period. 
Bridge failures suggest that there is still a clear 
need for risk assessment of structures, both in ser-
vice and during construction. Risks of structures in 
service should be examined to determine more ap-
propriate assessment, inspection and strengthen-
ing/repair criteria, especially in order to account for 
external extreme events such as natural hazards, ve-
hicle impacts and other forms of accidents. Risk 
analyses during the construction stage will aid in se-
lecting methods and procedures that have higher no-
tional reliability and to introduce controls that will 
prevent failures. As suggested in recent SCOSS re-
ports, utilising the ‘3Ps’, pertaining to people, proc-
ess and product, can help describe and categorise the 
contributory factors which may lead to failure. The 
‘3Ps’, emphasise the wide range of influences in de-
signing and constructing structures, and ensure that 
‘human factors’ are a key component of any risk as-
sessment (SCOSS, 2007).   
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